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Abstract: The paper is focused on the security issues of sensors provided with processors 
and software and used for high-risk applications. Common IT related threats may cause 
serious consequences for sensor system users. To improve their robustness, sensor systems 
should  be  developed  in  a  restricted  way  that  would  provide  them  with  assurance.  One 
assurance creation methodology is Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) used for IT products 
and systems. The paper begins with a primer on the Common Criteria, and then a general 
security model of the intelligent sensor as an IT product is discussed. The paper presents 
how the security problem of the intelligent sensor is defined and solved. The contribution of 
the  paper  is  to  provide  Common  Criteria  (CC)  related  security  design  patterns  and  to 
improve the effectiveness of the sensor development process. 
Keywords: Common Criteria; IT security development; intelligent sensor; design pattern 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The  paper  discusses  the  application  of  the  ISO/IEC  15408  Common  Criteria  (CC)  assurance 
methodology [1] to the development of intelligent sensors. Assurance is understood as a situation when 
an  entity,  e.g.,  designed  IT  product  or  system,  meets  its  security  objectives,  in  other  words,  the 
implemented measures will be able to counter threats when they occur. The paper presents a specific 
security view of a group of numerous and diversified technical devices called intelligent sensors, which 
contains sensor-, processing- and communicating facilities. Generally, sensors are devices that measure 
some  physical  quantity  and  convert  the  result  into  a  signal  which  can  be  read  by  an  observer  or 
instrument, but intelligent sensors are also able to process measured values. A number of such devices 
contain actuators as well.  
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Intelligent  sensors  are  used  in  many  application  domains,  and  the  number  of  these  domains  is 
growing, though the number of finalized Common Criteria certification processes of these IT products 
is relatively low. The motivation of this paper is to provide developers with knowledge and specific 
design patterns related to the application of the Common Criteria methodology to the development of 
intelligent  sensors.  This  can  help  them  in  a  broader  use  of  this  methodology  in  dependable  
sensor solutions.  
Generally, security design patterns are reusable proven solutions to security problems with respect to 
the specific context, and they are usually related to the software development, e.g., as discussed in the 
book [2]. These solutions may concern different issues: how to design identification and authentication, 
access  control  based  e.g.,  on  passwords,  how  to  implement  an  encrypted  communication  channel, 
communication path, packet filtering for a firewall, accountability subsystem, etc. With respect to the 
Common  Criteria  methodology  these  security  design  patterns  are  related  to  the  security  functions 
implemented within the IT product or system according to the security functional requirements. Another 
kind of security design patterns is discussed in this paper—patterns closely related to the Common 
Criteria  methodology,  expressing:  assets,  legal  subjects,  attackers,  threats,  security  policies, 
assumptions and security objectives, used to elaborate the security requirements specification for the IT 
product or system, and finally, the security functions implemented in the IT product or system. Here 
discussed ― Common Criteria (CC) related security design patterns‖, mentioned briefly in the paper as 
― patterns‖ or ― design patterns‖, are focused on the risk management issues, not on the IT security 
solutions. The CC-related patterns concern the design process (called here IT security development), 
can  be  used  in  many  projects  (i.e.,  they  are  reusable),  but  in  a  certain  context  (i.e.,  in  the  
CC-methodology context). Such patterns can be applied for different kinds of IT products or systems 
but in the paper only the patterns subset related to sensors and sensor networks are discussed. 
The paper focuses on the identification of intelligent sensors common features, allowing us to define 
a generalized model of such devices and, on this basis, to elaborate CC-related design patterns which 
can be used to specify security models of intelligent sensors. The discussed patterns concern only two 
stages  of  the  Common  Criteria  compliant  IT  security  development  but  these  stages  are  of  key 
importance: the security problem definition and its solution.  
The paper includes the following sections. Section 2 contains a review of intelligent sensor security 
issues  and  sensor  applications.  Section  3  contains  the  CC  methodology  primer  for  sensor  systems 
developers not familiar with this methodology. A generalized model of the intelligent sensor allowing to 
create the CC security model for itself is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents selected issues of the 
Common  Criteria  compliant  development  process  applied  to  intelligent  sensors,  focusing  on  two 
important  issues:  specification  of  the  security  problem  definition  and  solution.  The  proposed 
specification means were elaborated on the basis of a review of the literature included in Section 2. 
Section  6  discusses  model  evaluation.  The  last  section  concludes  the  paper  and  specifies  the  
planned works. 
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2. Intelligent Sensors and Their Basic Security Issues 
 
The progress in low-power CMOS processing, communication circuits and transducer technology 
has enabled new possibilities and applications, including advanced processing within the nodes (― motes‖) 
of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Apart from a class of sensors working in WSNs, other groups 
exist in different application domains. Intelligent sensors can work autonomously or co-operate with 
control systems supervised by SCADA or different monitoring units. Some of them are designed for 
special applications, e.g., motion sensors for digital tachographs.  
The security and safety issues are important for intelligent sensors because very often they are used 
for responsible technical applications in varied, high-risk environments. These issues can be considered 
in the context of connectivity aspects due to the fact that intelligent sensors are elements of wireless 
sensor networks or can communicate indirectly with other systems in a different way. Basic research 
fields concerning sensor systems and their applications deal with energy efficiency, network protocols, 
distributed databases, as well as discussed here security issues.  
Sensor systems designers focus on solving separate technical issues which are specific due to the 
resource  limitation  of  the  sensor  nodes  (limitations  concern  power  sources,  processing  and 
communication capabilities). 
The security analysis of wireless sensor networks [3] points at the possibility of individual node 
interception. This problem can be solved by using advanced cryptographic and authentication algorithms 
which  require  increased  processing  resources.  The data transmitted between nodes and data stored 
within nodes should be secured. An important issue is to protect a cryptographic key used for securing 
data stored within nodes.  
The  denial-of-service  attacks  vulnerability  of  large  scale  sensor  networks  is  discussed  in  the 
dissertation [4]. These attacks, performed from the outside or from an intercepted node, have different 
forms, such as: false data reports causing false alarms, excessive power consumption, and congestion of 
wireless channels. Due to the node computational limitation, some filtering algorithms, such as Bloom 
filters, are considered to solve this problem (messages can be broadcast to the selected nodes only, 
determined by a filter). 
The  paper  [5]  discusses  basic  security  issues  of  wireless  sensor  networks,  including  the  routing 
behaviour,  node  tamper  resistance,  and  implementation  of  commonly  known  security  mechanisms 
(encryption,  key  management,  authentication,  authorization).  The  use  of  these  mechanisms  is  very 
difficult due to the node resource limitations. Specific solutions for wireless sensor networks have been 
developed based on the set of nodes provided with sensors and with actuators. The paper [5] presents 
an  ambient  intelligence  application  to  control  the  environment.  Environmental  data  are  sampled  by 
sensors, then aggregated and processed by external servers to extract knowledge about the environment. 
On the basis of this knowledge, control data are elaborated and passed to actuators. The data influence 
environmental parameters. The problem of data reliability has been solved on the application level with 
the use of a trust-based decision framework. The paper discusses most of commonly known attacks on 
the nodes, networks and applications, which will be considered later, once the intelligent sensor security 
model has been worked out. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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A general review of security problems related to wireless sensor networks is provided in [6] with 
respect to both variants of networks: the hierarchical WSN (nodes of different capabilities, the network 
topology is known) and the distributed WSN (no fixed infrastructure, huge number of nodes, usually 
scattered in a hostile uncontrolled environment, the network topology is unknown). The paper studies 
well  known  WSN  dedicated  security  protocols  and  solutions  (SNEP—Secure  Network  Encryption 
Protocol,  µTESLA—Micro Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication, TinySec—the link 
layer security architecture for WSN, TinyPK—public key technology for WSN) which can be helpful in 
the implementation of the further discussed security objectives (Section 5).  
The specific key management issues in a decentralized wireless network environment are discussed in 
the paper [7]. Different key management schemes with respect to network architecture and protocols 
properties have been developed, including NRFP (Novel Re-keying Function Protocol) presented in the 
paper.  The  network  base  station  provided  with  long-lasting  power  is  distinguished.  It  works  as  a 
controller (or a key server) for other nodes. The protocol is based on the symmetric key cryptography, 
hash functions and the used two modes of re-keying operations.  
The paper [8] discusses the security problems specific to the Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) 
used  to  build  applications  improving  road  safety  and  providing  information  services  for  drivers. 
VANETs are a kind of MANETs, i.e., Mobile Ad Hoc Network, which are self configuring networks of 
mobile  devices  connected  by  wireless  links.  In  VANETs,  road vehicles are equipped with network 
devices playing the role of routers. The communication is assured among nearby vehicles and between 
vehicles and nearby fixed equipment (roadside equipment). When a vehicle moves with high velocity, 
the topology changes rapidly. Due to this fact the following attacks can be performed more easily: 
jamming, data forgery, impersonation, and privacy violation. This may cause more complicated security 
problems. For example, issuing false car position information, or claiming multiple falsified identities (a 
Sybil  attack)  causing  the  illusion  of  traffic  congestion,  may  cause  serious  traffic  control  system 
disturbance.  To  solve  these  problems,  specific  measures  are  used.  VANETs  security  needs  further 
researches and can be another field of applications of the presented method.  
The paper [9] reviews the fourth generation of cellular communication systems (4G), the MANET 
networks and their common use in battlefield applications. The problem is to provide energy to such 
mobile devices. The features of both rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries are discussed with 
respect to the battlefield requirements. The batteries have limited life, and their considerable weight 
(with reserve ones) should not reduce the soldiers’ mobility. Geographical factors (shape of the land) 
and environmental factors (natural mountains differ from urban areas with metal-concrete and electric 
barriers) may influence the communication ability of the military 4G MANETs. Additionally, specific 
risks  related  to  the  enemy’s  actions  disturbing  communication  between  army  forces  should  be 
considered during the development of these military wireless networks.  
The  specific  issues  of  a  mote-based  medical  sensor  network  are  discussed  in  [10].  Long-term 
monitoring of vital signs of chronic-diseases patients requires dependable operations, data privacy and 
authenticity  protection.  The  proposed  security  mechanism  consists  of  a  scheme  for  verifying  the 
authenticity of the patient’s data, key agreement protocol to provide shared keys for sensor nodes and 
base stations, and the implementation of a symmetric key encryption/decryption system for protecting 
data confidentiality and integrity. Two hardware solutions for motes implementation were considered. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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One of them will be discussed later, during the identification of the  common features of intelligent 
sensors and working out the security model for them.  
The paper [11] summarizes the comparative analysis of common threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and 
applied  measures  for  two  areas:  smart  card/RFID  technology  and  wireless  sensor  network  node 
technology. The assumed TVAC security model (Threat-Vulnerability-Attacker-Countermeasure) can 
be useful to define properly threat items in the methodology presented below. While comparing these 
two technologies, it was pointed out that wireless sensor networks are poorly standardized. Besides, 
only few CC certificates concern the WSN technology. Wireless sensors developers can benefit from 
numerous  experiences  (hundreds  of  finalized  CC  certification  processes)  in  smart  card  and  RFID 
systems  development  because  attacks  on  smart  cards  apply  to  WSN  nodes  and  some  node 
RF/Communications  attacks  may  apply  to  contactless  smart  cards  and  RFIDs.  Microcontroller 
architectures,  tamper  resistance,  resource  limitation,  and  communication  issues  are  very  similar  in  
both technologies. 
Intelligent  sensors  are  able to work autonomously as well.  The advanced Dräger Polytron 7000 
Fixed gas detector [12] is an example of an intelligent sensor designed for responsible applications.  
It  is  able  to  detect  over  100  different  gases  and  has  a  modular  structure.  It  is  provided  with  
communication facilities.  
The implementation of the above mentioned mechanisms, like: cryptographic or filtering algorithms, 
advanced specialized key management or routing protocols in sensor networks, requires right assurance 
because they are extremely important to provide reliable and secure operation of the entire network and 
network-based  applications.  The  above  mentioned  works  focus  on  specific  and  advanced  security 
mechanisms, however, they do not provide a methodology how to implement these mechanisms with 
proper assurance, for example with the use of well known assurance methodologies, like the ISO/IEC 
Common  Criteria  methodology.  Considering  the  intelligent  sensor  as  a  typical  IT  product  and  the 
networked sensor system as an IT system, the Common Criteria methodology can be applied to them  
as well.  
The works dealing with the Common Criteria application in sensors and sensor systems development 
are scarce, though they are becoming a new, promising Common Criteria standard application domain. 
The most relevant concern: 
  airplane health monitoring systems, 
  safety-critical assets distribution systems, 
  motion sensors of digital tachographs, 
  SCADA-related products, 
  specialized firewalls used in control and automation systems, co-operating with sensor networks. 
The paper [13] presents a sensor system, based on a wireless network, supporting the transfer of 
sensor  data  and  information  onboard  commercial airplanes  (eEnabled airplanes) as well as between 
airplanes  and  their  supporting  ground  systems.  Such  systems,  called  AHMMS  (Airplane  Health 
Monitoring and Management Systems), are applied in the latest generation of aircrafts to improve the 
safety and efficiency of air travel. AHMMS monitor permanently the health of airplane structures and 
board systems using embedded sensors and give timely feedback to the flight control computer working 
on the board and to the airline ground server for health assessment. To secure the electronic distribution Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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of software, cryptographic key and data between airplane and ground systems the Common Criteria 
methodology  is  used.  The  new  application  of  this  methodology  encompasses  the  identification  of 
specific  security  threats,  requirements,  and  mitigation  mechanisms  based  on  the  Public  Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) services and digital signatures. Securing the communication channel between the 
aircraft and ground system is a very important issue, though it does not concern intelligent sensors 
directly, but communication with the sensor-based system.  
A  similar  issue  concerns  asset  distribution  systems  which  should  securely  load  the  authorized 
software (e.g., safety standards compliant software, firmware for intelligent sensors) or contents (data, 
security related data, unique identifiers, cryptographic keys, etc.) to physical objects, like airplanes [14], 
vehicles  or  other  specialized  equipment.  The  integrity  and  authenticity  of  the  distributed  assets  is 
significant  for  the  safety  and  security  of  these  objects.  The  presented  research  is  focused  on  IT 
infrastructure for distribution of safety-critical and business-critical airplane software (EDS—Electronic 
Distribution of Loadable Software) and data [15].  
In the automotive industry the assets can be loaded to different embedded electronic control units in 
vehicles [16], tachographs, their motion sensors [17], etc. While continuing research on cyber-physical 
systems and eEnabled applications, some challenges were identified [16], like: building of specialized 
high-assurance PKI, use of formal methods for an end-to-end analysis of assets distribution systems, 
removing  vulnerabilities  and  analyzing  the  impact  of  security  on  safety.  The  Common  Criteria 
methodology can effectively support these efforts. 
The digital tachograph system [17-19] consists of a vehicle unit, the considered motion sensor and a 
smart  card  used  to  log  in  to  this  unit.  The  uniquely  identified  motion  sensor  includes  a  dedicated 
microcontroller  placed,  together  with  other  circuits,  on  a  relatively  small  sized  printed  circuit  
board—located in a sealed housing, which is screwed into the gear box. The movement detector (a 
hallotron) transforms the rotations to electric pulses which are sent to the microcontroller of the vehicle 
unit  as  a  rough  ― Speed  signal‖  and  to  the  motion  sensor  microcontroller.  The  data  are  processed 
concurrently in both locations and results are compared. The microcontroller exchanges information 
(distance travelled, speed, status, commands) with the vehicle unit through a cryptographically secured 
channel  (― Data  signal‖).  The  motion  sensor  performs  advanced  data  processing  in  a  heavy  duty 
environment.  The  Common  Criteria  standard  is  used  to  evaluate  the  security  of  tachograph  
systems [20-22]. For the motion sensors, a full life-cycle model was applied, considering not only the 
operational environment, but also development-, manufacturing- and maintenance environments. This 
means, for example, that the threats existing in the development environment, e.g., ― breaching design 
data‖, ― improper testing‖ are considered because they may influence the motion sensor misbehaviour in 
its operational environment.  
Intelligent sensors can be used in control systems (field controllers) cooperating with SCADA as well. 
Security problems of these systems are growing because they are often parts of critical information 
infrastructures. The paper [23] discusses a new generation of SCADA systems used to control virtual 
utilities,  aggregating  distributed  resources,  like:  microgrids,  wind  farms,  fuel  cells,  etc.  into  single, 
centralized energy systems. Analyzing the security of these systems, the author of [23] concludes that 
SCADA  products  should  be  evaluated  with  the  use  of  the  Common  Criteria  standard  to  avoid 
compromising the security or safety of the critical infrastructure by these products. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Moreover, the Common Criteria standard was applied in the development of the equipment used to 
secure wireless networks, like firewalls, routers, intrusion detection systems, and the microcontrollers to 
be used for intelligent sensors implementation, including control automation. 
Analyzing these works it is possible to create a common picture related to the intelligent sensors 
security features, applications and sensors co-operation within other systems. It should be also stressed 
that  there  is  lack  of  knowledge  and  CC-related  design  patterns  possible  to  use  in  the  IT  security 
development.  The  Common  Criteria  methodology  requires  a  specific,  methodical  approach  to  the 
identification and description of security items, like threats, security policies, countermeasures, etc.  
The works discussing the character of known attacks [3-9] do not present them with the use of the 
CC  methodology.  Still,  these  works  can  be  helpful  to  define  these  attacks  according  to  the  CC 
specification  convention  (i.e.,  attacker-asset-attack  method/  used  vulnerability)  to  define  measures 
countering these threats and to provide the required rationale for the applied measures.  
The paper [11] points at similarities between the smart card/RFID technology and wireless sensor 
network node technology with respect to threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and applied measures. Because 
the smart card/RFID solutions group is one of the most numerous groups of certified IT products or 
systems [24], the published security specifications for these solutions can be helpful for wireless sensor 
developers  as  well  as  with  respect  to  the  above  mentioned  risk  management  issues,  i.e.,  threats, 
vulnerabilities, etc. 
The complete set of specification items for the motion sensor of digital tachographs is published  
in [17] but it is specified by an old EU standard (ITSEC – Information Technology Security Evaluation 
Criteria, 1991). These items, called also ― generics‖, can be used indirectly for motion sensors evaluated 
according to Common Criteria, like the sensor described in [20]. Some other works [13-16, 23] have 
focused  on  securing  systems  co-operating  with  sensors  systems  are  emerging  and  do  not  concern 
intelligent sensors directly, but rather their environment.  
To sum up, there is little research focused directly on the intelligent sensors development according 
to  Common  Criteria.  Some  works  deal  with  platforms for experimentations  built to enable sensors 
applications in high-risk environments. In this case the security issues do not go beyond the operational 
environment  and  full  life-cycle  model,  encompassing  also  the  development,  manufacturing  and 
maintenance environments. The intelligent sensor development can be discussed as one of the emerging 
application domains of the CC standard. Similarly to other new domains, it requires support for IT 
security developers in order to facilitate their work. This support may concern Common Criteria related 
security design patterns, knowledge on how to use these patterns and specialized tools.  
 
3. Common Criteria Methodology—Primer 
 
The  Common  Criteria  standard  (ISO/IEC  15408)  is  the  leading  assurance  methodology  which 
provides dependable IT solutions for applications when the assessed risk is high or the appreciated asset 
value is significant. As it was mentioned above, assurance is the confidence that an IT product or system, 
called TOE (target of evaluation), meets the security objectives specified for it. This means that the 
built-in security functions related to these objectives and representing measures will work effectively Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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whenever a threat occurs. Assurance is measured by evaluation assurance levels (in the range EAL1 to 
EAL7) and depends on the rigour applied to the security development.  
The  first  part  of  the  standard  [1]  presents  a  general  model  and  structures  of  basic  security 
requirements specifications, called security target (ST) and protection profile (PP). The second part 
includes  functional  components  used  to  express  security  functional  requirements  (SFRs)  for  TOE 
security  functions  representing  TOE  built-in  countermeasures.  The  third  part  contains  assurance 
components used to express security assurance requirements (SARs) for these security functions. Both 
sets of components constitute a semiformal ― language‖ to uniformly express security requirements.  
The EALs are well balanced packages (sets of components) of SARs. Both kinds of CC components 
are grouped by families which, in turn, are grouped by classes. They are used as specification means of 
security requirements. 
The assurance level is claimed by developers who provide evidences that the given EAL is met. An 
IT product or system (TOE), its security target (ST) and the related evidences are evaluated to get the 
certificate [24]. The ST is considered as a complete, implementation-dependent security specification of 
the  TOE.  The  main  parts  of  the  ST  are:  security  problem  definition,  security  objectives,  security 
requirements  and  security  functions.  The  second  kind  of  the  security  specification  is  the  
mplementation-independent protection profile (PP) which does not contain these functions. Security 
targets can be elaborated directly on the basis of the users’ requirements or with the use of previously 
evaluated protection profiles. 
The CC methodology encompasses the following processes: 
  IT security development process, identified with the security target (ST) work-out, specifying the 
TOE security functions;  
  TOE  development  process  with  the  use  of  the  assumed  technology  (elaboration  of  the  TOE 
evaluation evidences, expressing the implementation of these functions on the EAL declared for 
the TOE); 
  IT  security  evaluation  and  certification  process  (not  discussed  here),  providing  independent 
analyses, verifications if the claimed EAL is met. 
The IT security development process [1]/Part 1 has the following stages:  
1. Work-out of the ― ST introduction‖, containing different identifiers, informal TOE overview and 
TOE description; 
2. Conformance  claims  with  the  Common  Criteria  version,  protection  profiles  and  packages, 
including EAL;  
3. Security problem definition (SPD); SPD specified threats, OSPs (organizational security policies) 
and assumptions for the TOE and its environment;  
4. Solution  of  this  problem  by  specifying  security  objectives  (SO)—for  the  TOE  and  
its environment; 
5. Extended components definition, when needed (i.e., when the developer should define his/her 
own component due to its lack in the standard); Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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6. Work-out of the security functional requirements (SFRs) specification on the security objectives 
basis, and the set of security assurance requirements (SARs) which are derived mainly from the 
declared EAL; 
7. Creating the TOE summary specification, including the TOE security functions derived from the 
SFRs;  they  are  implemented  in  the  TOE  on  the  claimed  EAL  during  the  TOE  
development process. 
The  TOE  development  is  the  second  CC  key  process.  Apart  from  the security target itself, the 
mentioned evaluation evidences encompass documentation and records concerning ([1]/Part3): 
  TOE architecture, its functional specification, design, security policy, implementation—expressed 
by the ADV (Development) assurance class components (please note that according to [1] each 
assurance class name begins with the letter ― A‖, two other letters concern the issues described by 
the class), 
  configuration  management,  product  delivery,  development  process  security,  used  
tools—represented by the ALC (Life-cycle support) class components, 
  tests specification, test depth and coverage – influenced by the ATE (Tests) class components, 
  product manuals and procedures, worked out according to the AGD (Guidance documents) class 
components, 
  vulnerability assessment according to the AVA (Vulnerability assessment) assurance class.  
When IT products or systems are properly designed, managed in a life cycle, fully and deeply tested, 
carefully documented, with identified and assessed vulnerabilities, and, moreover, thoroughly evaluated 
by an independent body, they can be applied in high-risk environments. 
 
4. Intelligent Sensors Model for IT Security Development Process 
 
The  paper  is  focused  on  intelligent  sensors  (sensor  nodes,  motes),  not  on  sensor  networks  or  
control- and SCADA systems, although connectivity aspects will be considered too. To discuss the 
security features of the intelligent sensor, a common, generalized sensor model should be elaborated. It 
will be used for security consideration according to the Common Criteria methodology. To develop the 
generalized  intelligent  sensor  model,  another  group  of  publications,  presenting  different  sensors 
architectures, ought to be reviewed.  
The paper [25] discusses the architecture and features of wireless intelligent sensors with complete 
systems on a chip, integrated low-power communication facility, and integrated low-power transducers. 
The presented example of an intelligent sensor, used to measure temperature and light, consists of a 
microcontroller (MCU) with internal memories: flash program memory, data SRAM and data EEPROM. 
It is connected to a set of sensors and actuators. The intelligent sensor also includes LEDs (connected 
to  I/O  ports  displaying  digital  values  or  status),  a  low-power  radio  transceiver  (for  external 
communication), analogue photo-sensor, digital temperature sensor (A/D converter connected by means 
of I
2C, i.e., Inter-Integrated Circuit interface), serial port (UART), and a small coprocessor unit. This 
unit is connected by SPI, i.e., Serial Peripheral Interface, to allow sensor reprogramming by transferring 
data from the network into the coprocessor EEPROM. As an operating system, TinyOS is applied Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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allowing concurrency handling in a very limited memory space. Because the presented intelligent sensor 
is a prototype for evaluation and further development, physical security (a case, seal, etc.) was not 
considered  for  it.  The  device  is  simply  implemented  on  a  small  printed  circuit  board,  convenient  
for experimentation. 
Hardware solutions for sensor nodes (called motes) used for permanent monitoring of long-term care 
patients are presented in [10]. One of the used hardware platforms was Crossbow MICA [26]. MICA 
(as well as IRIS), operating on TinyOS, consists of: Atmel© ATMega128 MCU (8-bit microcontroller 
with 128 K Bytes In-System Programmable Flash, digital and analog I/O) [27], RF transceiver, flash 
data  logger  memory  (storing  data  and  measurements,  over-the-air  reprogramming  under  TinyOS), 
power source (batteries), and sensor board interface (to connect peripheral sensors and data acquisition 
boards or base station, including connections for: A/D converter, UARTs, I
2C, digital I/Os). The latest 
IRIS is equipped with the ZigBee standard [28], ready radio frequency transceiver (of better range), and 
sensor ID facilities. Many advanced solutions were developed according to this proprietary standard, 
including network processors [29] with implemented protocols.  
The paper [30] describes another new general-purpose wireless sensor node architecture designed 
for experimentation, educational projects and preliminary deployment in industrial environments. It is 
based  on  the  OKI  ARM  ML67Q500x  microcontroller  and  Chipcon  CC2420  ZigBee-compliant 
communication subsystem. Four-layer software architecture was applied, encompassing: sensor drivers, 
preprocessing and measurement storage, localization algorithms, and sensor network applications. 
Echelon FT 5000 Smart Transceivers/ Neuron®5000 [31] is another representative example of a 
platform  for  intelligent  sensors.  The  Neuron  chip  series,  provided  with  multiple  processors,  ROM, 
RAM, communication and I/O subsystems, is able to perform key functions necessary to process inputs 
from  sensors  and  control  devices,  and  to  propagate  control  information  across  different  kinds  of 
network media. Neuron contains three processors to manage the operations of the chip, the network, 
and the user application. At higher clock rates, it is additionally equipped with a separate processor to 
handle  interrupts.  Peripheral  transducers  (sensors,  control  devices)  can  be  connected  through  I/O 
subsystems. The SPI and I
2C interfaces can be used for external coprocessor or memory (EPROM, 
FLASH)  connection.  The  above  mentioned  FT  5000  transceiver,  connected  to  the  Neuron 
communication  subsystem,  is  designed  for  the  polarity-insensitive,  free-topology,  twisted-pair 
LonWorks networks. Each chip has a unique 48-bit identification number, called Neuron ID. Related 
Neuron  firmware  provides  implementation  of  the  LonTalk®  protocol  for  LonWorks  networks, 
developed by Echelon for years.  
The  review  shows  that  intelligent  sensors  have  similar  architecture.  Analyzing  these  selected 
solutions, a general model has been elaborated. The model serves as a reference model for the devices 
discussed here. Sometimes refined, it can be used to prepare the ― TOE description‖ being a part of the 
security target specification, to define the security problem and to propose its solution. The level of 
details should be adequate to perform these tasks – a block scheme level is usually enough. A simplified, 
generalized sensor model, co-operating with the sensor network and elaborated on the basis of the 
above examples, consists of four-key elements (Figure 1): 
  microcontroller, equipped with a specialized operating system, communication and application 
software, different devices, such as memories, including non-volatile memories, interfaces, timers, Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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counters, sometimes other coprocessors (e.g., crypto-processors, network processors and other 
specialized processors), interfaces to external memories, and other devices (I
2C, SPI), 
  low-power transducers (varied sensing/controlling devices), 
  communication facilities, including low-power wireless facilities or traditional/industrial network 
interfaces (wired, optical facilities), 
  power source (battery, solar, external sources). 
The  intelligent  sensor  is  able  to  perform  some  processing  tasks  to  sample  information  and  to 
communicate  with  other  connected  nodes  in  the  network.  Restricted  sensor  resources  (related  to 
processing, transmission, energy) limit its capability. 
Figure 1. Generalized model of the intelligent sensor used for security analyses during the 
IT security development process. 
 
 
The general model should be able to express the TOE user functionality and the essential parts of the 
TOE with respect to security issues, such as: what is a part of the TOE and what is a part of the TOE 
environment, connections with co-operating entities, logical and physical TOE boundaries, etc. These 
issues are important when the above mentioned TOE overview and TOE description sections of the 
security target are developed. Moreover, the general model should contain details sufficient to identify 
protected assets (where they are, who their owners are), affecting intruders, entities co-operating with 
the TOE, threats, and certain assumptions (e.g., dealing with the connectivity aspects). These issues are 
considered during further discussed security problem definition and solution. 
Depending on the project character, the TOE may encompass almost all elements from Figure 1, or 
only its selected parts, e.g., the TOE may be a ― microcontroller without coprocessor‖, ― (cryptographic) 
coprocessor of the microcontroller‖, ― communication software‖ or ― application which processes, in the 
microcontroller, the data sampled by the sensor‖, etc. Different solutions for different applications are 
possible. Analyzing the security of a given sensor node as the TOE, some details can be added, e.g., 
those from the above reviewed solutions.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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5. Common Criteria IT Security Development Process—Intelligent Sensor Specific Issues 
 
The IT security- and TOE development processes include different security analyses of interrelated 
issues,  rationales,  decisions,  and  work-out  of  extensive  and  precise  documents.  The  mentioned 
processes are time-consuming and costly, require specialized knowledge and, basically, are difficult for 
IT developers, including electronic engineers. These problems disable a broader use of dependable IT 
solutions. The paper is related to the author’s more extensive works aiming at the improvement of  
the  CC  methodology  by  introducing  a  semiformal  description  and  by  using  the  knowledge  
engineering methodology. 
The  Common  Criteria  compliant,  UML/OCL-based  IT  security  development  framework  
(ITSDF) [32-34] was elaborated. The framework embraces: 
  models of data structures and processes of IT security development stages, including: security 
problem definition, security objectives elaboration, security requirements, and security functions 
workout; 
  models of the specification means used for these IT security development stages, including CC 
components and the introduced semiformal enhanced generics. 
The  introduced  enhanced  generics,  derived  from  ― generics‖  commonly  used  by  developers,  are 
defined as mnemonic names expressing common features, behaviours or actions related to IT security 
issues, like: subjects, objects, threats, assumptions, security policies, security objectives, and functions. 
They  are  ― enhanced‖  since  they  are  semiformal  and  have  features  comparable  to  CC  components, 
allowing  such  operations as: parameterization, derivation, iteration, and refinement. The semiformal 
ITSDF framework was implemented as a software tool to support IT security developers.  
In the next step, the knowledge engineering methodology [35] was applied to this framework [36,37]. 
Using the Protégé tool from Stanford University [38], the domain ontology and related knowledge base 
were elaborated. Generally, ontology represents explicit formal specifications of the terms in the domain 
and  relations  between  these  terms.  The  considered  domain  is  the  discussed  Common  Criteria 
development methodology. 
The elaborated ITSDO (IT Security Development Ontology) represents the security requirements 
structures (ST, PP), specification means to fill in these structures  with contents for different TOEs 
(author’s  defined  enhanced  generics,  CC-defined  functional  and  assurance  components)  as  well  as 
patterns for evidences. About 350 enhanced generics were predefined as elementary items designed to 
specify  general  security  features  of  commonly  used  IT  product  or  systems.  The  intelligent  sensors 
discussed here are very specific, so their specification items have not been elaborated yet. This paper 
presents the first step of the work aiming at the extension of the elaborated ontology and knowledge 
base  to  the  new  field  of  applications,  i.e.,  intelligent  sensors  development.  These  devices  can  be 
considered as a certain knowledge subdomain extending the existing knowledge domain.  
Due to the extended range of this work, it was divided into two tasks. The paper encompasses the 
first task – the identification of terms and relationships constituting the considered ontology subdomain. 
The identified below enhanced generics can be used as Common Criteria related security design patterns 
and to express security issues of any intelligent sensor in a traditional way (i.e., without knowledge base 
support). Besides, defining these generics enables the knowledge base extension to intelligent sensors. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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In the next task, planned in the near future, the identified terms and relations will get ontological 
representation providing new possibilities offered by the knowledge engineering approach, like [35]: 
  sharing common understanding of the structure of information among people or software, i.e., 
mainly the structure of the components, generics and evidences;  
  reusing the domain knowledge, i.e., using the same specification means in different projects and 
deriving their new variants from the previously defined ones;  
  making  explicit  assumptions  for  a  domain;  it  concerns  predefined  parameters  and  predefined 
mapping relations between specification items; 
  separating the domain knowledge, expressed by the specification means as a whole, from the 
operational knowledge allowing to use these means to compose the ST of the given IT products 
or systems; 
  providing the domain knowledge analyses concerning: variants, semantics, risk, relationships of 
the developed specification means, etc. 
 
5.1. Defining Common Criteria related security design patterns—general rules 
 
Enhanced generics can be used as predefined Common Criteria related security design patterns which 
allow one to compose IT security specifications for varied intelligent sensors. This subsection gives a 
short  introduction  to  the  assumed  enhanced  generics  notation,  which  is  similar  to  the  notation 
commonly  used  by  IT  security  developers  (dot  separated  fields)  but  more  precise.  In  the  author’s 
previously mentioned works the enhanced generics were defined on a different level of abstraction, like 
formal grammar, UML objects, ontology classes individuals, sets of literals, etc. For this work it is 
enough to assume that, similarly to the SFR/SAR components, an enhanced generic consists of textual 
fields separated by dots: 
Family.Mnemonic.Description.Refinement 
The Family field groups similar items. Each security model issue, like: assets, subjects, threats, etc., 
has its own possible values – mnemonic prefixes representing families. 
According to the CC-defined functional paradigm [1]/Part 2, an asset represents a passive entity 
within the considered system. The Family field for assets (data, services, software, IT infrastructure, 
documents, etc.) begins with ― D‖, and the following values are allowed (the symbol ― |‖ means ― or‖): 
Family ::= DTO|DIT|DAP, where:  
― DTO‖   –  ― TOE related assets‖,  
― DIT‖   –  ― assets within the TOE IT environment‖, 
― DAP‖   –  ― assets within the TOE physical environment‖. 
Subjects, representing active entity, are preceded by prefixes: Family ::= SAU|SNA|SNH, where:  
― SAU‖   –  ― authorized subject, e.g., user, administrator, process‖, 
― SNA‖   –  ― unauthorized entity, e.g., intruder‖, 
― SNH‖   –  ― non-human malicious entity, e.g., force majeure, failure‖. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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For threats, the following prefixes are defined:  Family ::= TDA|TIT|TPH, where: 
― TDA‖   –  ― direct attacks against the TOE‖,  
― TIT‖   –  ― attacks against the TOE IT environment‖,  
― TPH‖   –  ― attacks against the TOE physical environment‖.  
Assumptions, addressed to the TOE environment, have prefixes: Family ::= ACN|APR|APH, where: 
― ACN‖   –  ― connectivity aspects‖, 
― APR‖   –  ― personnel/organizational aspects‖,  
― APH‖   –  ― physical aspects‖.  
Similar prefixes are defined for security objectives: 
Family ::= OACC|OIDA|OADT|OINT|OAVB|OPRV|ODEX|OCON|OEIT|OEPH|OSMN  
and for organizational security policies (OSPs): 
Family ::= PACC|PIDA|PADT|PINT|PAVB|PPRV|PDEX|PCON|PEIT|PEPH|PSMN, where:  
― OACC/PACC‖   –  ― access control and information flow control‖,  
― OIDA/PIDA‖   –  ― identification and authentication‖,  
― OADT/PADT‖   –  ― accountability and security audit‖,  
― OINT/PINT‖   –  ― integrity‖,  
― OAVB/PAVB‖   –  ― availability‖,  
― OPRV/PPRV‖   –  ― privacy‖,  
― ODEX/PDEX‖   –  ― data exchange‖,  
― OCON/PCON‖   –  ― confidentiality‖,  
― OEIT/PEIT‖   –  ― TOE IT environment‖,  
― OEPH/PEPH‖   –  ― technical or infrastructure‖,  
― OSMN/PSMN‖   –  ― security maintenance‖. 
It should be mentioned that enhanced generics may express security functions as well (not discussed 
in the paper). Prefixes of the security functions begin with the letter ― S‖, and further include a CC 
functional class name which the given function deals with, e.g., for the ― FAU‖ class (audit), the security 
functions have the ― SFAU‖ prefix. 
The second enhanced generics field, developers-defined Mnemonic, expresses as briefly as possible 
(a few letters) security features, behaviour or actions (see examples below). 
The Description field presents concisely the generic meaning, using one or few sentences. This field 
may have parameters in square brackets representing any asset [Dparam] or any subject [Sparam]. 
Parameters  may  be  left  empty  (meaning:  ― any  possible‖)  or  substituted  (symbol:  ― <=‖)  by  an 
appropriate asset or subject generic. Thanks to parameterization, the iteration of enhanced generics is 
possible. In this case the given generics can be placed many times into the specifications with different 
parameters substituted, and presenting different aspects of the same issue. For example, the threat item 
with intruders of different attack potential attacking the same asset, or the threat with one intruder 
attacking different assets in a different way. Particular instances of the iterated enhanced generic are 
numbered,  placing  their  consecutive  numbers  in  brackets.  The  content  of  the  Description  field  is Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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predefined for enhanced generics placed in a tool library or knowledge base. By using the given generics 
in the project, some extra information can be added on the project level by means of the last, optional 
field, called Refinement. Similarly to the refined CC components, this word is placed below the generic 
description as an underlined word Refinement, which will be shown below using examples. 
 
5.2. Common Criteria related security design patterns for the security problem definition and solution 
by specifying the security objectives 
 
This  section  presents  examples  of  enhanced  generics  that  can  be  used  to  compose  the  security 
problem  definition  (SPD)  of  the  targets  of  evaluation  which  are  intelligent  sensors.  Most  of  these 
generics can be applied for sensor networks as well. These generics are defined on the basis of the 
author’s earlier work [21] and the results of the analysis of varied specific attacks on wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) described in Section 2.  
The  depth  of  the  analysis  required  to  elaborate  the  security  problem  definition  depends  on  the 
designers’ needs and design character. For most of the identified elementary security issues (threat, OSP, 
assumption),  security  objectives  (SO)  are  proposed  to  solve  these  elementary  problems.  Some 
objectives  can  be  specified  for  the  TOE  and  some  of  its  environment.  The  most  representative 
specification items are shown below. They can be used by developers to elaborate the security problem 
definition  and  security  objectives  specification  for  the  given  TOE.  The  elaboration  of  these 
specifications constitutes two of key importance initial stages of the IT security development process. 
The proposed enhanced generics encompass a full life-cycle model, starting from the TOE development 
phase, through manufacturing-, maintenance-, operation phases until the end-of-life phase. This broader 
view of assets, actors, threats, policies, assumptions, etc. in the life cycle, is important especially for 
sites distributed and compliant with the recently developed site certification concept [39].  
 
5.2.1. Assets and other passive entities 
 
Assets represent passive entities protected by the TOE, though some of them are placed in it and 
some are external. Enhanced generics are able to precisely express the identified assets. It should be 
known what is protected by the TOE. The value of an asset is important along with the risk (considered 
optionally) and they both influence the claimed EAL. Assets can be attacked by intruders, which is 
expressed by threats. Moreover, assets should be managed, which is expressed by the OSPs. For this 
reason the assets generics can be used as parameter values of other kinds of generics, especially threat 
and OSPs generics.  
The basic asset for any intelligent sensor are data sampled for users and data related to the sensor 
operation  (data  processing)  and  communication.  These  data  can  be  expressed  using  the  following  
TOE-related enhanced generic: 
DTO.SensorData. Data measured, stored, processed, or transmitted by the intelligent sensor and 
data related to the network services.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Usually the intelligent sensors have restricted resources. The availability of these resources allows 
right  operation  of  the  sensors.  It  is  especially  important  for  sensors  which  work  within  a  wireless 
network. Sensor resources critical for the right operation can be expressed in the following way: 
DTO.NodePowerRes. Energy supplying a sensor node.  
DTO.NodeProcesRes. Node processing ability. 
DTO.NodeTransmRes. Node data transmission ability. 
Depending on the domain and character of application, sensors are provided with different security 
measures concerning: identification, authentication, protection of confidentiality or integrity, etc. Data 
related with these measures, called security-related data, are also assets requiring special protection,  
for example: 
DTO.SensorID. Unique identification number of an intelligent sensor. 
DTO.Password. Password for authentication. 
DTO.JoinKey. Keys allowing to connect to the network.  
DTO.CryptoKey. Symmetric cryptographic key. 
DTO.Credent. Credential or shared secret. 
DTO.RndNumber. Random number to derive a cryptographic key. 
DTO.PubKey. Public key. 
DTO.PrivKey. Private key. 
To consider more complex relationships, like: mutual security dependencies, propagation/escalation 
effects,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account  other  sensor  nodes,  computer  systems  and  software 
applications existing in the network. These assets are placed within the TOE IT environment, which is 
denoted by the ― DIT‖ Prefix. Moreover, the data sampled as a whole from all network sensors may be 
considered too.  
DIT.BaseStation. A distinguished node of a wireless sensor network (WSN) used to control the 
network or as a gateway intermediating between WSN and other network. 
DIT.CentralUnit. The entity supervising and/or monitoring sensors. 
DIT.NeighbourSenNode.  A  neighbour  node  whose  security  mutually  relies  on  the  considered 
sensor node. 
DIT.SampledDataBase.  Data  sampled  by  sensors  and  stored  in  a  common  data  base  on  the 
distinguished server. 
For certain kinds of sensors, when a detailed life-cycle model is applied, the assets related to the 
development-, manufacturing- and maintenance processes performed in the ― site‖ [39] are considered. 
This is because breaching these assets influences indirectly the basic or security-related assets of sensors 
operating in the network. For example, an unauthorized modification of a firmware, configuration lists, 
tests, specialized equipment, options of compilers, etc. during the development/manufacturing process, 
may later cause serious problems in the operation environment. These assets exist far from the TOE 
operational environment—somewhere in the TOE physical environment, i.e., in the ― site‖. All these 
assets can be expressed by one specification item of the ― DAP‖ prefix, which can be also refined by 
adding some details (please note the refinement operation example). Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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DAP.DesignData. Sensitive project data and documentation. 
Refinement: Logical, physical design data of the TOE hardware, software specifications, code and 
other  related  documentation,  development  aids,  test  data,  user  data  related  documentation, 
material for software development and manufacturing process. 
 
5.2.2. Subjects and other active entities 
 
The next step is to identify active entities, including asset owners, legal users, intruders and other 
― actors‖ related to the TOE and its environment. The basic subject of the intelligent sensor system 
represents a ― sensor user‖, who/which can take different forms depending on the user’s nature. The 
personnel as the ― sensor user‖ usually communicate with the sensor indirectly, through the base station 
and network where the sensor works. Sometimes the ― sensor user‖ can be considered as a process 
communicating  directly  with  the  sensor  to  get  some  data  or to perform some operations.  In some 
conditions an authorized subject can play the role of an intruder as well. Moreover, the administrator of 
the network assets and applications is distinguished. 
SAU.IntellSensorUser. Authorized entity (user, process) who/which directly or indirectly uses the 
intelligent sensor. 
SAU.SensorNetAdmin. Authorized administrator of the sensor network and applications. 
To reflect the personnel activities (legal, permitted and malicious) in development, manufacturing 
and maintenance processes, the following items representing key actors are predefined: 
SAU.Developer.  Personnel  involved  in  the  design  phase  (hardware/software  designer, 
programmer, test engineer). 
SAU.ManufPers. Personnel involved in the manufacturing processes (components manufacturing, 
assembly, security data insertion, storage, distribution, repair). 
SAU.ServicePers.  Personnel  involved  in  sensor  or  sensors  system  maintenance  (storage, 
installation, inspection, calibration, repair). 
Intruders in the operational environment including initiators of harmful events are the following:  
SNA.HighPotIntruder. Attacker having high level skills, enough resources and deep motivation to 
perform a deliberate attack. 
SNH.ForceMajeure. Different kinds of unforeseen reasons of harmful events. 
Refinement: Catastrophes, accidents, failures, overheating, fire, water, etc. 
Intruders in the development-, manufacturing- and maintenance environment are specific: 
SNA.IndustIntrud. Industry spy or intruder trying to get or counterfeit the design data. 
 
5.2.3. Threats related to the intelligent sensor with respect to the full life cycle 
 
The predefined enhanced generics allow to specify varied threats. Most generics have parameters 
expressing active entities, e.g., legal subjects, intruders (Sparam), and passive entities, e.g., attacked 
assets (Dparam). Thanks to these parameterization- and refinement abilities, the iteration can be applied Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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while the threats specification has been elaborated. As it was mentioned earlier, the iteration allows to 
place a given threat into the specification with different parameter values assigned, or with different 
refinements added. Different kinds of threats are distinguished. For any group of threats representing 
elementary security problems, two groups of related items are proposed: 
  representative  examples  of  passive  and  active  entities  that  can  be  considered  as  threat  
parameter value, 
  security  objectives  for  the  TOE  and/or  for  its  environment  (lines  indented)  countering  these 
threats and being the typical solutions of these elementary problems. 
Sometimes  one  threat  can  be  solved  by  one  security  objective,  but  usually  some  objectives  are 
specified for the TOE and some, of supporting character, for the TOE environment. Below, one or 
more objectives are added for any group of threats (intended lines).  
Basic threat items express security issues related with the operational environment, especially attacks 
focused  on  the  data  sampled,  stored,  processed  and  transmitted  by  the  intelligent  sensor.  These  
items  will  be  supplemented  later  by  threats  related  to  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and  
maintenance-processes. 
First, a threat example concerns a direct attack against data sampled (measured) by the sensor. This 
generic can be refined depending on the kind of sensor and measured data. The important issue is that 
input  data  cannot  be  disrupted  or  counterfeited  by  any  reason.  The  proposed  security  objectives 
(countermeasures)  concern  tamper-resistance,  reliable  solutions  and  sensors  inspections.  For  some 
operational environments, some of these measures can be impossible or hard to implement. Instead, the 
network redundancy mechanisms can be applied. For sensors provided with actuators, a very similar 
elementary security problem can be defined and solved with respect to the output data of the actuator. 
TDA.DisruptSampling. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.IntellSensorUser, SNA.HighPotIntrud] 
could try to manipulate the sensor input [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] causing wrong input data. 
OINT.TamperResistance. The TOE guarantees its own physical/logical integrity. The means 
of detecting physical tampering must be provided (e.g., seals, tampering detection, special 
reinforced cases, intrinsically safe solutions). 
OAVB.Reliability.  The  sensor  must  provide  reliable  service.  Applying  fault  tolerance 
methods and techniques. 
OSMN.RegularInpections.  The  sensor  must  be  periodically  inspected  and  calibrated  
(if necessary). 
OAVB.RedundNodes. Apply redundant sensor nodes, allowing to lose nodes without any 
impact on the network (or network application) behaviour as a whole. 
The data properly sampled by the sensor are stored, processed and prepared for sending through the 
network to the central database or to any process control or monitoring unit. The second group of 
threats concerns direct attacks against the data stored or processed within the sensor node. The data can 
be eavesdropped, modified or even fabricated. It is possible due to simple or complex network attacks 
finalized by illegal data access. Depending on the node and threat character, different aspects should be 
emphasized in the threat item definition. The first example describes complex attack on the node from 
the network, three others—more specific attacks. To counter these threats, the access control, fault Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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tolerance  and  authentication  mechanisms  are  generally  recommended.  To  protect  confidentiality, 
cryptographic methods should be applied. All of them can be supported by audit facilities. The barrier of 
the node resources (discussed further) can be encountered by applying advanced cryptography.  
TDA.NodeCompromise. Attacker [Sparam] can: eavesdrop the traffic, inject packets or replay 
older  messages,  because  wireless  communication  generally  is  not  secure.  After  the  node 
compromising, all information it holds [Dparam] is known to the attacker and/or node operation 
or communication is broken [Dparam]. 
OACC.Access. The sensor must control access of connected entities. 
OIDA.Authentication. The sensor must authenticate connected entities. 
OADT.Audit. The sensor must audit attempts to undermine its security and should trace 
them to the associated entities.  
OINT.Processing The sensor must ensure that the processing of input to derive output data  
[Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] is accurate. 
OAVB.DataFreshness. Ensure that the message received [Dparam] is the message sent by 
the authorized source [Sparam] but not a replayed message sent by the intruder [Sparam].  
TDA.Access. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.IntellSensorUser, SNA.HighPotIntrud] could 
try to access functions or data [Dparam] they are not allowed to. 
OACC.Access. The sensor must control access of connected entities. 
TDA.SensorDataEavsdrop. Intruder [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] eavesdrops sensor data  
[Dparam <= DTO.SensorData]. 
OCON.DataEncrypt. Encrypt the data [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData]. 
TDA.SensDataMdfy. Intruder [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] modifies sensor data (falsifies 
them) [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData]. 
OIDA.Authentication. The sensor must authenticate connected entities. 
The  sampled  and  partially  processed  data  are  sent  to  other  nodes,  data  base  servers  or  to  any 
control/monitoring equipment. The next group of threats represents attacks aimed at sensor networks 
and the sensor node transmission ability, constituting the TOE IT environment (TIT). 
TIT.CommInterfer.  Intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  interferes  network 
communication by sending messages through different protocol layers (e.g., jamming, collisions, 
flooding), causing that the data [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] are lost (usually inconspicuously 
for their owner or destination) or the node disappears (― has been stolen‖). 
ODEX.CommQuality.  Avoidance  of  interference,  blocked  communication  spaces,  using 
specialized measures against jamming, collision and flooding. 
OINT.DataVerification. Verify that the data [Dparam] are valid. 
OINT.MajorityVoting. Apply the majority voting scheme to determine the validity of an 
alarm raised by neighbouring nodes based on their own measurement. 
TIT.RoutingMisuse. Intruder [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] interferes routing by ignoring 
all or some messages or network communication. 
ODEX.MultipleCommPaths.  Use  redundant  communication  paths,  specialized 
countermeasures (e.g., against blackholes, misdirection, wormholes), and controlling of the 
routing information. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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TIT.Malware.  Malicious  software  designed  to  infiltrate  or  damage  a  sensor  node  or  
sensor network. 
TIT.BackdoorOpen.  Using  the  wireless  access  point  an  intruder  [Sparam  <= 
SNA.HighPotIntruder] creates a backdoor for the network of an organization (corporation) from 
the sensor node side. 
TIT.AttackPropagation.  The  possibility  of  attack  propagation  from  a  node  to  other  nodes, 
gateways and external servers. 
OACC.Access. The sensor must control access of connected entities. 
OIDA.Authentication. The sensor must authenticate connected entities. 
OINT.AntiMalware. Specialized anti-malware software. 
TIT.UncontrolledArea.  Due  to  uncontrolled  pervasiveness  of  a  wireless  sensors  network,  
the  node  works  in  an  uncontrolled  network  area  accessible  to  potential  intruders  
[Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder]. 
OEIT.SecPerimVsTrRangeCtrl. The physically controlled security perimeter, where nodes 
are placed, should be defined with respect to the range of wireless transmission. 
For some safety-critical applications a special class of threats should be considered, which express 
scenarios  how  IT  security  problems  may  cause  safety  problems.  This  kind  of  threat  has  complex 
character  just  like  the  above  mentioned  TIT.CommInterfer  and  should  be  refined  after  a  detailed 
analysis  of  the  threat  nature  in  the  considered  environment,  e.g.,  in  the  aircraft  environment.  The 
selection of security objectives for it is not easy, because probably the multilayered protection should be 
applied, encompassing most of the above specified objectives. 
TIT.SafetyProblem.  The  manipulation  (corrupting,  replaying,  blocking)  by  [Sparam]  of  the  data 
[Dparam] sampled by sensors with the intention of hiding or delaying detection of safety-critical 
faults in the safety critical equipment to potentially induce hazards.  
Direct attacks related to the general sensor node vulnerability, i.e., limited resources, are varied. 
They can supplement the SPD specification when resource availability is critical for the right operation 
of the sensor or its countermeasures.  
If three assets (DTO.NodePowerRes, DTO.NodeProcesRes, DTO.NodeTransmRes) are attacked by 
one intruder (SNA.HighPotIntruder) in the same way, this elementary problem can be expressed by one 
threat countered by one security objective: 
TDA.LimitResour.  Exploiting  vulnerability  related  to  the  node  limited  resources  
[Dparam  <=  DTO.NodePowerRes,  DTO.NodeProcesRes,  DTO.NodeTransmRes],  an  intruder 
[Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes  misbehaviour,  disconnection  or  faults  within  
the system. 
OAVB.ResUnderControl.  Control  resource  [Dparam  <=  DTO.NodePowerRes, 
DTO.NodeProcesRes, DTO.NodeTransmRes]. 
If each asset is threatened by an intruder using different methods, iterations are more convenient 
(please note that this issue presents an example of iteration). The considered threat and the objective 
which counters the threat are iterated three times for any kind of ― limited resources‖: Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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TDA.LimitResour(1).  Exploiting  vulnerability  related  to  the  node  limited  resources  
[Dparam  <=  DTO.NodePowerRes],  an  intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes 
misbehaviour, disconnection or faults within the system. 
OAVB.ResUnderControl(1). Control resource [Dparam <= DTO.NodePowerRes]. 
TDA.LimitResour(2).  Exploiting  vulnerability  related  to  the  node  limited  resources  
[Dparam  <=  DTO.NodeProcesRes],  an  intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes 
misbehaviour, disconnection or faults within the system. 
OAVB.ResUnderControl(2). Control resource [Dparam <= DTO.NodeProcesRes]. 
TDA.LimitResour(3).  Exploiting  vulnerability  related  to  the  node  limited  resources  
[Dparam  <=  DTO.NodeTransmRes],  an  intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes 
misbehaviour, disconnection or faults within the system. 
OAVB.ResUnderControl(3). Control resource [Dparam <= DTO.NodeTransmRes]. 
Direct  attacks  against  the  security-related  data  concerning  the  sensor  node  identity  lead  to 
counterfeit  the  sensor  network.  Some  nodes  disappeared,  some  are cloned.  Applying a unique and 
properly controlled identifier for any node can be helpful (please note the DTO.SensorID asset). For 
some  classes of sensors, e.g., motion sensors  of tachographs, unique identifiers are used. They are 
controlled  and  inserted  by  dedicated  PKI-based  (Public  Key  Infrastructure)  mechanisms  [17].  The 
WSN-specific threats and measures discussed in [5] are expressed below. 
TDA.CloneNode.  Attacker  [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] duplicates an operational node 
causing  that  both  nodes  (i.e.,  original  and  duplicated  one  of  the  same  identity)  are  able  to 
communicate with the given node. 
TDA.ReplaceNode.  Attacker  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  steals  (disables)  operational 
nodes and replaces them with the malicious ones of falsified identities. 
TDA.FabricateNode. Attacker [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] adds a malicious node with 
fabricated identity to the network as an operational node. 
TDA.SybilAttack. Attacker [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] adds a malicious node presenting 
multiple  identities,  as  if  it  were  multiple  nodes  to  control  a  considerable  part  of  the  system, 
breaching its redundancy. 
OIDA.ControlID. Using the properly managed unique identifiers of sensors [Dparam <= 
DTO.SensorID]. 
OINT.IdentCapVsNodeCap.  Testing  limited  resource  (radio  communication  capability). 
Assuming that a device can access only one radio channel at a time and checking that each 
identity has no less capability than a physical node (all identities have channels assigned and 
must send messages through them simultaneously; the system detects the attack when it 
receives no message in its channel). 
OCON.CryptoScheme. Applying the cryptographic scheme (key management, operations) 
with respect to the existing communication resources. 
OEIT.IdentPositionVsNodePosition. Assuming that no identities are at the same position, 
checking  the  identity  position  versus  the  node  position  claiming  this  identity.  Sensor 
measurements are credible when they can be associated with their physical locations. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Other  security-related  data  include  secrets  or  cryptographic  variables  [1]/Part 2.  Specific  attacks 
against them can be expressed as follows:  
TDA.PowAnalys.  The  power  consumption  of  some  microprocessors  causes  leakage  of 
information  during  certain  cryptographic  operations.  The  attacker  [Sparam  <= 
SNA.HighPotIntruder] uses this information to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be 
considered in a brute-force search for the secret key [Dparam <= DTO.CryptoKey]. 
OINT.PowAnalResist. Solutions resistant to the simple/differential power analysis attacks 
(SPA/DPA) are implemented. 
TDA.SecDataLeakage.  The  attacker  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes  that  security 
sensitive  data  (authentication  data,  keys,  credentials,  etc.)  [Dparam  <=  DTO.CryptoKey, 
DTO.RndNumber] leak out from the TOE. 
OCON.CryptoBoundary.  Setup  the  cryptographic  boundary  inside  the  TOE  from where 
security sensitive data [Dparam] shall not leak. The boundary encompasses the TOE parts 
where security sensitive data are generated, stored, updated and used. 
OCON.SecDataProt.  When a node is turned off, no security material (such as a shared 
secret or a static public/private key) [Dparam] should have to be stored permanently in the 
non-volatile memory of the node (a pre-configured shared secret obviously does not satisfy 
this requirement).  
Refinement: See details in [10]. 
Attacks  against  node  integrity  encompass  different  tampering  cases.  Protection  relies  on  
tamper-resistance, fault tolerance and right management.  
TDA.Tamper.  Intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntrud]  physically/logically  compromises  a 
sensor node to get assets [Dparam] or disrupt the node operation [Dparam]. 
TDA.EnvironAttack. Intruders [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntrud] could compromise the sensor 
security through environmental attacks (thermal, electromagnetic, optical, chemical, mechanical). 
TDA.PowerSupply. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.IntellSensorUser, SNA.HighPotIntrud] 
defeat the sensor security by modifying (cutting, reducing, increasing) its power supply [Dparam 
<= DTO.NodePowerRes]. 
OINT.TamperResistance. The TOE guarantees its own physical/logical integrity. The means 
of detecting physical tampering must be provided (e.g., seals, tampering detection, special 
reinforced cases, intrinsically safe solutions). 
OAVB.Reliability.  The  sensor  must  provide  reliable  service.  Applying  fault  tolerance 
methods and techniques. 
OAVB.RedundNodes. Apply redundant sensor nodes, allowing to lose nodes without any 
impact on the network (or network application) behaviour as a whole. 
OSMN.RegularInpections.  The  sensor  must  be  periodically  inspected  and  calibrated  
(if necessary). 
Sensor  networks,  similarly  to  other  IT  systems,  need  proper  management  based  on  proven 
procedures. Attacks related to insufficient administration may cause different security problems.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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TIT.SecDataAdmin. Insufficient administration of the network and security related data [Dparam] 
of the sensor network by [Sparam <= SAU.SensorNetAdmin]. 
OSMN.SecDatManag. Periodic changes to security data [Dparam] managed by [Sparam]. 
OSMN.NetAdmin. Network administration and security policy procedures implementation. 
Sensors  may  work  in  varied  environments  (industry,  university  laboratories,  battle  fields,  mines, 
buildings, hospitals, etc.). They are open to unforeseen natural catastrophes, emergencies, failures, etc. 
These issues can be expressed by a simple generic which can be refined according to the circumstances 
specific to the operational environment.  
TDA.Faults.  Faults  caused  by  [Sparam  <=  SNH.ForceMajeure]  in  hardware,  software, 
communication procedures could place the sensor node in unforeseen conditions compromising  
its security. 
OINT.TamperResistance. The TOE guarantees its own physical/logical integrity. The means 
of detecting physical tampering must be provided (e.g., seals, tampering detection, special 
reinforced cases, intrinsically safe solutions). 
OAVB.RedundNodes. Apply redundant sensor nodes, allowing to lose nodes without any 
impact on the network (or network application) behaviour as a whole. 
Depending  on  the  sensor  type  and its development-, manufacturing- and maintenance processes, 
some  threats  should  be  specified  as  TPH  items  for  the  sites  where  these  processes  are  run.  It  is 
important  because  any  vulnerabilities  or  insufficiencies  related  to  the  processes  may  later  influence 
sensors  in  the  operational  environment.  To  simplify  this  issue,  all  these  threats  are  countered  by 
implementing the right management system in the site [39]. Details depend on SARs included in the 
claimed EAL (not discussed here). 
TPH.Design. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.Developer, SAU.ManufPers, SAU.ServicePers, 
SNA.IndustIntrud] could try to gain illicit knowledge of the design [Dparam <= DAP.DesignData] 
either from the manufacturer's materials (through theft, bribery, illegal access to IT resources) or 
from reverse engineering. 
TPH.Test.  The  use  of  non-invalidated  test  modes  by  [Sparam  <=  SAU.Developer, 
SAU.ManufPers,  SAU.ServicePers]  or  not  detected  backdoors  could  compromise  the  
sensor security. 
TPH.SecurityData. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.ManufPers, SNA.HighPotIntrud] could 
try to gain illicit knowledge of security data [Dparam] during security data generation, transport 
or storage in the equipment. 
TPH.Software.  Users  or  intruders  [Sparam  <=  SAU.Developer,  SAU.ManufPers, 
SAU.ServicePers, SNA.HighPotIntrud] could try to modify the sensor software. 
OSMN.SiteProcess.  Site  processes  encompassing  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and 
maintenance activities in the life cycle are properly defined, implemented and managed.  
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5.2.4. Organizational security policies (OSP) related to the intelligent sensor with respect to the full  
life cycle 
 
Usually  the  security  problem  definition  is  expressed  in  a  preferable way, i.e., as ― the protection 
against identified threats‖, allowing to obtain more precise and coherent specifications. For this reason 
OSP  declarations  may  have  auxiliary  meaning.  For  the  considered  sensors  working  in  the  network 
environment, OSPs can be used to claim general rules concerning the system usage, for example:  
PAVB.SensorSysMain. The data [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] transmitted by the sensor must 
be  available  to  the  supervising-  or  data  sampling  unit  [Dparam]  so  as  to  allow  the  unit  to 
determine fully and accurately the sampled data.  
OAVB.SensorSysMain.  The  data  [Dparam  <=  DTO.SensorData],  sampled  by  the  
sensor-based acquisition/monitoring system [Dparam] checked by control authorities, must 
be available and reflect fully and accurately the system objectives. 
The  second  Dparam  parameter  of  the  PAVB  and  OAVB  items  can  be  substituted  by: 
DIT.BaseStation,  DIT.SampledDataBase  or  DIT.CentralUnit, with respect to  the situation. Another 
kind of OSP applications can be conformance declarations with technical or security standards, legal 
acts, their specific parts or selected policies. For example, they can deal with the security management, 
cryptography usage, functional safety, ATEX (fr. Atmosphere Explosible) directive, cyber security, etc. 
Security objectives enforcing these OSPs should add more details according to given circumstances and 
needs. From these policies, similar security objectives for the TOE environment are usually derived. 
Examples of these OSP declarations are: 
PSMN.ISO27001.  Within  the  sensor  development  and  manufacturing  environment  the  ISMS 
(Information  Security  Management  System),  according  to  ISO/IEC  27001,  should  
be implemented. 
PSMN.ThreatVulnNotif.  Notification  of  threats  and  vulnerabilities  according  to  
ISO/IEC 27001/A12.6.1. Appropriate authorities shall be immediately notified of any threats or 
vulnerabilities impacting systems that process their data. 
Refinement: With respect to WSN and the implemented network application. 
PSMN.ISA99.  Ensure  compliance  with  the  ISA  99  Manufacturing  and  Control  Systems  
Security Standard. 
PINT.IntrinsicSafe. The intelligent sensor should be intrinsically safe.  
 
5.2.5. Assumptions related to the intelligent sensor with respect to the full life cycle 
 
The efficacy of the countering threats and the efficacy of the enforcing OSPs depend on satisfying 
some assumptions addressed to the TOE environment. Below some examples of assumptions dealing 
with  the  personnel  and  organizational  issues  [21]  are  shown.  Assumptions  related  to  the  right 
administration and usage supplement this set. All of them are transformed to the appropriate security 
objectives for the environment, which upheld these assumptions. The contents of these objectives will 
be reflected later, during the TOE development process, in documentation and procedures related to the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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development, manufacturing and maintenance processes of the discussed device. To simplify this issue, 
only one security objective of the TOE environment was declared, which upheld all these assumptions.  
APR.Development.  Sensor  developers  [Sparam  <=  SAU.Developer]  must  ensure  that  the 
assignment  of  responsibilities  during  the  development  is  done  in  a  manner  which  maintains  
IT security. 
APR.Manufacturing. Sensor manufacturers [Sparam <= SAU.ManufPers] must ensure that the 
assignment  of  responsibilities  during  manufacturing  is  done  in  a  manner  which  maintains  IT 
security,  and  that  during  the  manufacturing  process  the  sensor  is  protected  against  physical 
attacks which might compromise IT security. All testing facilities for the manufacturing phase 
(test points, commands) should be removed or disabled before delivery. 
APR.Delivery.  Sensor  manufacturers,  fitters,  workshops  [Sparam  <=  SAU.ManufPers, 
SAU.ServicePers] must ensure that handling of the sensor is done in a manner which maintains  
IT security. 
APR.SecDataGenAlgor. Security data generation algorithms must be accessible to authorized and 
trusted persons only [Sparam <= SAU.Developer, SAU.ManufPers]. 
APR.SecDataInsert. Security data [Dparam] must be generated, transported and inserted into the 
sensor in such a way to preserve its appropriate confidentiality and integrity by the authorized 
[Sparam <= SAU.ManufPers]. 
APR.ApprovedWorkshops. Installation, calibration and repair of the sensor and its monitoring 
unit  must  be  carried  out  by  trusted  and  approved  fitters  or  workshops  by  the  authorized  
[Sparam <= SAU.ServicePers]. 
APR.SoftwareUpgAnal. Software revisions must be granted security certification before they can 
be implemented in the sensor. There is no way to analyze or debug software in the field. 
OSMN.SiteProcess.  Site  processes  encompassing  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and 
maintenance-activities in the life cycle are properly defined, implemented and managed. 
APR.TrustAdmin.  One  or  more  authorized  administrators  [Sparm]  are  assigned  who  are 
competent to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains, and who can be 
trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine security. 
OSMN.SecManAdmin.  The  TOE  will  provide  facilities  to  enable  an  authorized 
administrator [Sparam] to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, and will 
ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality. 
APR.IntendedUse. The TOE will be used to perform a task or function for which it was designed  
by [Sparam]. 
OSMN.UserAwarn. User awareness, proper operation regulations and procedures. 
The defined specification means have open character and can be applied as Common Criteria related 
security  design  patterns  to  a  broad  group  of  intelligent  sensors  as  it  was  discussed  in  the  
above examples.  
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6. Evaluation Issues 
 
First  evaluation  of  this  methodology  was  discussed  in  [21,22].  It  was  restricted  to  one  kind  of 
sensors, i.e., to the motion sensors of digital tachographs, but all IT security development stages were 
shown  and  the  design  compliance  with  the  [17]  requirements  was  achieved.  The  presented  set  of 
specification items (CC-related patterns) was extended to other kinds of sensors and, for this reason, 
validations on these products are necessary. Two kinds of validation are possible: 
  extensive validation on near-real projects like the above mentioned motion sensor; validation on 
intelligent sensors detecting methane is in progress and will be summarized in a separate paper; 
  partial validation focused on the selected issues; it will be shown on the example below. 
The aim of partial validation is to show if predefined CC-related design patterns can be applied in 
several typical design circumstances. 
 
6.1. Validation example 
 
The  example  deals  with  an  intelligent  medical  sensor,  working  within  the  Secure  Wireless  
Mote-Based Medical Sensor Network. It was elaborated on the basis of the paper [10] and with the use  
of  [26,27]  technical  information  sources.  The  example  shows  how  to  express  key  elements  of  the 
security target (ST) of the intelligent medical sensor considered as the target of evaluation (TOE), with 
the use of the Common Criteria related security design pattern elaborated for the generalized sensor 
model. For the purposes of this example let us call the considered TOE the ― Intelligent, Mote-Based 
Medical Sensor (IMBMS)‖. The example does not provide directly the selected parts of the ST, it 
rather discusses how to elaborate them. The discussion embraces the informal IT products descriptions 
included  in  the  ― ST  introduction‖  and  the  issues  dealing  with  the  security  problem  definition  and 
solution. The ST documents are rather extensive [24] and the full ST cannot be discussed here in details.  
 
6.1.1. Informal IT product description included in the ― ST introduction‖ 
 
Apart from the TOE identifier, e.g., ― IMBMS – Intelligent, Mote-Based Medical Sensor, ver. 1.0‖, 
and the ST identifiers, e.g., ― ST for the IMBMS ver. 2.0‖, the ― ST introduction‖ contains the ― TOE 
overview‖ and the more detailed ― TOE description‖, where the basic TOE features and components are 
described. For the discussed IMBMS sensor, the TOE description can look as follows: 
― The IMBMS system (Figure 2) is designed for distance, long-term monitoring of patients with 
chronic diseases. Each patient, biometrically identified, is provided with the mote with medical 
sensors watching her/his vital signs. Patients can move in the range of medical or home facilities. 
Motes are communicating with the distinguished base station through relay nodes of the wireless 
sensor network (WSN). Using the base station, the physician (a legitimate, authenticated user) is 
able to send a data query related to the given patient to the mote, which activates the appropriate 
medical sensors. The data channel is formed by a set of relay nodes. Many motes and base stations 
may exist within the system.‖ Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure  2.  General  architecture  of  the  ― Secure  Wireless  Mote-Based  Medical  Sensor 
Network‖ [10]. 
 
 
One of important issues is to present what the TOE is and what is in the TOE environment, defining 
the  TOE  logical/physical  components  and  the  TOE  boundary,  e.g.,  a  continuation  of  the  
― TOE description‖:  
― The TOE (target of evaluation) is a Crossbow MICA2 based mote (Figure 3). The TOE consists 
of the Atmega128L microcontroller with the TinyOS operating system, Chipcon’s CC1000 RF 
transceiver  with  antenna,  ― Flash  Data  Logger‖  (4-Mbit  serial  flash  memory  for  storing  data, 
measurements, user-defined information, and used for over-the-air reprogramming provided by 
TinyOS),  power  source  (2  AA-type  batteries),  3  LEDs  displaying  status,  and  the  expansion 
connector. The TOE also includes the application and communication software running under 
TinyOS.  The  TOE  boundary  is  marked  with  dashed  lines.  The  medical  sensors,  measuring 
physical values related to vital signs, and the biometric identification device, like a fingerprint 
reader, all connected to the expansion connector, are not the parts of the TOE‖. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 3. IMBMS—Intelligent Mote-Based Medical Sensor as the TOE. 
 
 
6.1.2. Protected assets 
 
The first step of the security problem definition is the identification of assets that should be protected. 
Assets may be placed within the TOE or in its environment. The main asset are the patient’s medical 
data sampled by the mote, which can be expressed by  a previously defined enhanced generic, here 
refined. Moreover, a new asset-type generic, i.e., the TOE provided services, is defined, related to the 
sensor operation, i.e., measuring, sampling, processing, transferring data, and displaying the mote status.  
DTO.SensorData. Data measured, stored, processed, or transmitted by the intelligent sensor and 
data related to the network services.  
Refinement: Medical data of the monitored patient. 
DTO.SensorService. Services provided by a sensor: measuring, sampling, processing, transferring 
data, and displaying its status. 
Please note that the patient’s medical data are very sensitive, e.g., they may be misused by insurance 
companies, their counterfeiting may cause a wrong medical diagnosis which can put the patient’s life in 
danger, etc.  
The TOE also has security-related data used for the biometric identification of the monitored person. 
The ― closest‖ generic which can be used is DTO.Password but it does not concern biometrics. For this 
reason, the previously defined set of enhanced generics is supplemented by a new item: 
DTO.BioData. Biometric or physiological data used for the identification of a person. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Three  standard  enhanced  generics  related  to  the  resource  limitation  are  added  as  auxiliary  but 
important items (patient’s monitoring should be long-term and permanent): 
DTO.NodePowerRes. Energy supplying a sensor node.  
DTO.NodeProcesRes. Node processing ability. 
DTO.NodeTransmRes. Node data transmission ability. 
Because such an IT product as IMBMS protects sensitive medical data, the evaluation assurance 
level (not discussed there) declared for it will be probably EAL3 or above and then the security of the 
development  process  ought  to  be  considered  as  well  (please  note  the  ALC_DVS  assurance  
family—[1]/Part 3). For this reason, all design related data should be precisely identified and expressed, 
e.g., with the use of the previously define item:  
DAP.DesignData. Sensitive project data and documentation. 
Refinement: Logical, physical design data of the TOE hardware, software specifications, code and 
other  related  documentation,  development  aids,  test  data,  user  data  related  documentation, 
material for software development and manufacturing process. 
Careful and rigorous design, deployment and management of medical monitoring systems are very 
important for the patients and medical personnel.  
The mote co-operates directly with the base station, which can be also distinguished as an asset. 
DIT.BaseStation. A distinguished node of a wireless sensor network (WSN) used to control the 
network or as a gateway intermediating between WSN and other network. 
 
6.1.3. Identification of active entities—legal users and intruders 
 
There are two specific users of IMBMS. First, the patient who uses it passively (she/he is monitored) 
but may unintentionally cause harmful events (disruption of the monitoring, destroying the equipment), 
so  the  patient  will  be  considered  further  as  an  intruder.  The  second  kind  of  user  is  the  physician 
remotely monitoring the patient and having full access rights to the monitored data, as well as other 
medical personnel (a nurse) and household members taking care of the patient but having no full access 
rights to the monitored data.  The physician is authenticated before starting the work with the base 
station. Both these subjects can be expressed by the iteration of the early predefined enhanced generic: 
SAU.IntellSensorUser(1). Authorized entity (user, process) who/which directly or indirectly uses 
the intelligent sensor. 
Refinement: The monitored patient. 
SAU.IntellSensorUser(2). Authorized entity (user, process) who/which directly or indirectly uses 
the intelligent sensor. 
Refinement: The medical personnel (a physician remotely monitoring patients, a nurse visiting 
patients) and household members. 
The entire medical system, including the considered TOE, should be properly managed, developed, 
manufactured and maintained. For this reason, the following active entities (roles) are distinguished: 
SAU.SensorNetAdmin. Authorized administrator of the sensor network and applications. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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SAU.Developer.  Personnel  involved  in  the  design  phase  (hardware/software  designer, 
programmer, test engineer). 
SAU.ManufPers. Personnel involved in the manufacturing processes (components manufacturing, 
assembly, security data insertion, storage, distribution, repair). 
SAU.ServicePers.  Personnel  involved  in  sensor  or  sensors  system  maintenance  (storage, 
installation, inspection, calibration, repair). 
The intruder operating within the Secure Wireless Mote-Based Medical Sensor Network and the 
intruder  operating  within  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and  maintenance-environment  can  be 
expressed using the previously defined generics: 
SNA.HighPotIntruder. Attacker having high level skills, enough resources and deep motivation to 
perform a deliberate attack. 
SNA.IndustIntrud. Industry spy or intruder trying to get or counterfeit the design data. 
 
6.1.4. Identification of threats and security objectives which counter them  
 
For given threats, it is necessary to declare security objectives which counter them, for the TOE 
(IMBMS) and/or for its environment. Please note that this declaration expresses the responsibility in 
countering threats and decides  about the future TOE shape and features, because the TOE built-in 
countermeasures (i.e., security functions) are derived from the TOE security objectives only.  
The key issue for the intelligent medical sensor is the possibility to compromise the mote by the 
intruder  of  high  attack  potential  acting  from  the  outside  (WSN,  base  station)  and  exploiting 
vulnerabilities of the implemented network protocols. This compromising may lead to the sensor data 
and/or security-related data eavesdropping and/or their counterfeiting. These issues can be expressed by 
two predefined threat-type generics countered by four security objectives declared for the TOE only: 
TDA.NodeCompromise. Attacker [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntrud] can: eavesdrop the traffic, 
inject packets or replay older messages because wireless communication generally is not secure. 
After  the  node  compromising,  all  information  it  holds  [Dparam  <=  DTO.SensorData, 
DTO.BioData,  DIT.BaseStation]  is  known  to  the  attacker  and/or  node  operation  or 
communication is broken [Dparam <= DTO.SensorService]. 
TDA.SensDataMdfy. Intruder [Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder] modifies sensor data (falsifies 
them) [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData, DTO.BioData]. 
Security objectives declared for the TOE: 
OACC.Access. The sensor must control access of connected entities. 
OIDA.Authentication. The sensor must authenticate connected entities. 
OADT.Audit. The sensor must audit attempts to undermine its security and should trace them to 
the associated entities.  
OINT.Processing  The  sensor  must  ensure  that  the  processing  of  input  to  derive  output  data 
[Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] is accurate. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Applying a tampering attack, the intruder of high attack potential may intentionally compromise the 
physical or logical TOE integrity to get, modify or destroy the sensor data (any kind of data) and/or 
disrupt the intelligent sensor operation. Additionally, the monitored patient may unintentionally damage 
the mote or disrupt the sensor operation, which may be considered as tampering too. This threat is 
expressed  by  one  enhanced  generic  countered  by  two  objectives  for  the  TOE  and  two  for  
its environment: 
TDA.Tamper.  Intruder  [Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntrud,  SAU.IntellSensorUser(1)] 
physically/logically  compromises  a  sensor  node  to  get  assets  [Dparam  <=  DTO.SensorData, 
DTO.BioData] or disrupt the node operation [Dparam <= DTO.SensorService]. 
Security objectives declared for the TOE: 
OINT.TamperResistance. The TOE guarantees its own physical/logical integrity. The means of 
detecting physical tampering must be provided (e.g., seals, tampering detection, special reinforced 
cases, intrinsically safe solutions). 
OAVB.Reliability.  The sensor must provide reliable service. Applying fault tolerance methods  
and techniques. 
Security objectives declared for the TOE environment (the second was specially defined): 
OSMN.RegularInpections. The sensor must be periodically inspected and calibrated (if necessary). 
OEPH.PatientSecurity. The monitored patient is within the access-restricted area and the medical 
personnel or household members take care of her/him. 
The shortage of resources, especially energy, may be critical for long-term, permanent monitoring of 
the patient. It can be solved by remote reading of the resources status, watching equipment locally and 
reaction of responsible persons: 
TDA.LimitResour.  Exploiting  vulnerability  related  to  the  node  limited  resources  
[Dparam  <=  DTO.NodePowerRes,  DTO.NodeProcesRes,  DTO.NodeTransmRes],  an  intruder 
[Sparam  <=  SNA.HighPotIntruder]  causes  misbehaviour,  disconnection  or  faults  within  
the system. 
Security objectives declared for the TOE: 
OAVB.ResUnderControl.  Control  resource  [Dparam  <=  DTO.NodePowerRes, 
DTO.NodeProcesRes, DTO.NodeTransmRes]. 
Security objective declared for the TOE environment (defined): 
OEPH.PatientSecurity. The monitored patient is within the access-restricted area and the medical 
personnel or household members take care of her/him. 
Within the TOE environment there operate other motes, base stations and numerous WSN relay 
nodes. Each of them, if uncontrolled, may be accessible to potential intruders. This issue (problem and 
its solution) can be expressed as: Sensors 2010, 10                                       
 
 
853 
TIT.UncontrolledArea.  Due  to  uncontrolled  pervasiveness  of  a  wireless  sensors  network,  the 
node  works  in  an  uncontrolled  network  area  accessible  to  potential  intruders  
[Sparam <= SNA.HighPotIntruder]. 
Security objective declared for the TOE environment: 
OEIT.SecPerimVsTrRangeCtrl.  The  physically  controlled  security  perimeter,  where  nodes  are 
placed, should be defined with respect to the range of wireless transmission. 
The  entire  WSN  should  be  properly  used  and  managed.  This  issue  can  be  expressed  in  the  
following way: 
TIT.SecDataAdmin. Insufficient administration of the network and security related data [Dparam] 
of the sensor network by [Sparam <= SAU.SensorNetAdmin]. 
Security objectives declared for the TOE environment: 
OSMN.SecDatManag.  Periodic  changes  to  security  data  [Dparam]  managed  by  
[Sparam <= SAU.SensorNetAdmin]. 
OSMN.NetAdmin. Network administration and security policy procedures implementation. 
The design related data can be eavesdropped and abused in different ways (TPH.Design). Generally, 
they can be used to prepare attacks in the TOE operational environment or can be used by dishonest 
competitors. The second issue deals with insufficient testing (TPH.Test). All these problems can be 
solved by the implementation of technical, physical and organizational measures within the site where 
the TOE is developed, manufactured and maintained.  
TPH.Design. Users or intruders [Sparam <= SAU.Developer, SAU.ManufPers, SAU.ServicePers, 
SNA.IndustIntrud] could try to gain illicit knowledge of the design [Dparam <= DAP.DesignData] 
either from the manufacturer's materials (through theft, bribery, illegal access to IT resources) or 
from reverse engineering. 
TPH.Test.  The  use  of  non-invalidated  test  modes  by  [Sparam  <=  SAU.Developer, 
SAU.ManufPers,  SAU.ServicePers]  or  not  detected  backdoors  could  compromise  the  
sensor security. 
Security objective declared for the TOE environment: 
OSMN.SiteProcess.  Site  processes  encompassing  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and 
maintenance activities in the life cycle are properly defined, implemented and managed.  
 
6.1.5. Organizational security policies (OSPs) and security objectives which enforce them 
 
Similarly  to  the  threats,  for  given  OSPs  the  security  objectives,  which  enforce  them,  should  be 
declared for the TOE (IMBMS) and/or for its environment. In this example two OSPs are defined, 
covering  the  right  operation  of  the  system  and  legal  compliance  with  HIPAA  [40].  Only  security 
objectives for the TOE environment were declared for OSPs. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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PAVB.SensorSysMain. The data [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData] transmitted by the sensor must 
be available to the supervising- or data sampling unit [Dparam <= DIT.BaseStation] so as to 
allow the unit to determine fully and accurately the sampled data.  
Security objective enforcing the OSP within the TOE environment: 
OAVB.SensorSysMain. The data [Dparam <= DTO.SensorData], sampled by the sensor-based 
acquisition/monitoring system [Dparam <= DIT.BaseStation] checked by control authorities, must 
be available and reflect fully and accurately the system objectives. 
PSMN.HIPAA. Ensure the compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 
Security objective enforcing the OSP within the TOE environment: 
OEPH.HIPAA. The medical system should comply with the HIPAA Act. 
 
6.1.6. Assumptions and TOE environment security objectives which uphold them 
 
The  first  group  of  assumptions  concerns  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and  maintenance 
environment (called also the site) and the second deals with the right management and intentional use of 
the TOE in the operational environment. The TOE environment security objectives which uphold these 
assumptions were declared: 
APR.Development.  Sensor  developers  [Sparam  <=  SAU.Developer]  must  ensure  that  the 
assignment  of  responsibilities  during  the  development  is  done  in  a  manner  which  maintains  
IT security. 
APR.Manufacturing. Sensor manufacturers [Sparam <= SAU.ManufPers] must ensure that the 
assignment  of  responsibilities  during  manufacturing  is  done  in  a  manner  which  maintains  IT 
security,  and  that  during  the  manufacturing  process  the  sensor  is  protected  against  physical 
attacks which might compromise IT security. All testing facilities for the manufacturing phase 
(test points, commands) should be removed or disabled before delivery. 
APR.Delivery.  Sensor  manufacturers,  fitters,  workshops  [Sparam  <=  SAU.ManufPers, 
SAU.ServicePers] must ensure that handling of the sensor is done in a manner which maintains  
IT security. 
APR.ApprovedWorkshops. Installation, calibration and repair of the sensor and its monitoring 
unit  must  be  carried  out  by  trusted  and  approved  fitters  or  workshops  by  the  authorized  
[Sparam <= SAU.ServicePers]. 
This security objective upholds assumptions within the TOE environment: 
OSMN.SiteProcess.  Site  processes  encompassing  the  development-,  manufacturing-  and 
maintenance activities in the life cycle are properly defined, implemented and managed.  
APR.TrustAdmin. One or more authorized administrators [Sparm <= SAU.SensorNetAdmin] are 
assigned who are competent to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains, 
and who can be trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine security. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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This security objective upholds assumption within the TOE environment: 
OSMN.SecManAdmin.  The  TOE  will  provide  facilities  to  enable  an  authorized  administrator 
[Sparam <= SAU.SensorNetAdmin] to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, and 
will ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality. 
APR.IntendedUse. The TOE will be used to perform a task or function for which it was designed by 
[Sparam <= SAU.IntellSensorUser(2)]. 
This security objective upholds assumption within the TOE environment: 
OSMN.UserAwarn. User awareness, proper operation regulations and procedures. 
 
6.2. Summary of the example 
 
The  first  summary  issue  concerns  the  next  steps  of  the  IT  security  development  process,  not 
discussed in the paper. The security objectives for the TOE will be expressed by the security functional 
requirements [1]/Part 2, implemented in the security functions within the TOE at the claimed EAL, and 
finally evaluated. Seven TOE security objectives (all countering threats) are identified. Around these 
issues the future security functions will be developed. They are: 
OACC.Access, OIDA.Authentication, OADT.Audit, OINT.Processing, OINT.TamperResistance, 
OAVB.Reliability, OAVB.ResUnderControl. 
The security objectives for the TOE environment, despite of their destination (upholding assumptions, 
supporting TOE in countering threats or enforcing OSPs), will be envisaged in the different kinds of the 
development-, manufacturing- and operational-documentation and in security mechanisms implemented 
in  the  TOE  environment.  During  the  evaluation  they  are  considered  as  dogmas.  For  IMBMS  ten 
objectives for the TOE environment were identified: 
OSMN.RegularInpections,  OEPH.PatientSecurity,  OEIT.SecPerimVsTrRangeCtrl, 
OSMN.SecDatManag,  OSMN.NetAdmin,  OSMN.SiteProcess,  OAVB.SensorSysMain, 
OEPH.HIPAA, OSMN.SecManAdmin, OSMN.UserAwarn. 
The  second  summary  issue  concerns  Common  Criteria  related  security  design  patterns.  The 
simplified validation of the specification means (design patterns) elaborated for intelligent sensors shows 
that all basic security issues of the representative intelligent medical sensor can be expressed this way. 
As a result of this validation, this set was enriched by five new enhanced generics expressing specific 
issues.  The  first  concerns  biometrics,  the  second  sensors  services,  while  others  are  specific  for  
medical systems:  
DTO.BioData, DTO.SensorService, OEPH.PatientSecurity, PSMN.HIPAA, OEPH. HIPAA.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The  paper  shows  how  to  apply  the  Common  Criteria  methodology  to  the  process  of intelligent 
sensor development. Here presented Common Criteria related security design patterns can be applied in 
a broader group of sensors and their applications. One representative intelligent sensors example and its Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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applications were analyzed and then a generalized TOE model was developed. For this model the set of 
specification means as CC-related design patterns was defined to express security features of a broad 
range of sensors and their network applications. The capabilities of this set of design patterns were 
validated on the intelligent mote-based medical sensor. 
The intelligent sensor development can be discussed as one of emerging domains of the Common 
Criteria standard application. The contribution of the paper is to support IT security developers by 
providing them with: 
  Common  Criteria  related  security  design  patterns,  called  here  enhanced  generics,  to  define 
elementary  security  problems  (i.e.,  threats,  security  organizational  policies,  assumptions)  and 
elementary solutions of these problems (i.e., security objectives), with respect to the intelligent 
sensors needs and the life-cycle model, 
  knowledge  how  to  apply  these  patterns  to  elaborate  the Common Criteria complaint security 
model, called security target.  
The achieved results will be used to extend the author’s elaborated knowledge base supporting IT 
security developers. For a given intelligent sensor project the specification means can be selected from 
the proposed set and refined to describe more precisely and adequately the TOE security issues. The 
issues presented here encompass two most difficult IT security development stages with respect to 
specific needs of the sensors. General knowledge about the Common Criteria methodology is needed to 
express  the  next  stages,  i.e.,  elaboration  of  the  security  functional  requirements  on  the  security 
objectives  basis,  elaboration  of  the  security  functions  using  these  requirements,  as  well  as  the 
elaboration of evaluation evidences.  
Intelligent sensors are a broad and varied class of devices. For this reason, validations on different 
kinds of designs should be performed to improve the defined patterns. The validation on the motion 
sensor design has been finished recently [21,22], while the validation on the intelligent sensors detecting 
methane in the mining environment is in progress. Two variants are considered: 
  sensor operating within a wireless network, 
  sensor supervised by a monitoring unit and connected through a copper cable.  
The mentioned validations will be supported with the elaborated knowledge engineering tool [36,37] 
based on Protégé [38]. While the CC-related design patterns were defined, some problems concerning 
common  understanding  of  terms,  their  precise  definitions,  right  semantics,  and  relations  with  other 
terms are encountered. This can be solved by the ontology definition. The elaboration of this ontology 
can be considered as another direction of the planned works. This ontology should express a general 
attack model, encompassing both simple and complex attacks. The latter should be able to consider the 
primary  cause  of  the  attack  being  the  leverage  for  other  attack  or  series  of  attacks.  This  way the 
propagation  and  escalation  effects,  which  may  occur  in  wireless  sensors  networks,  can  be  taken  
into account. 
Please note that the Common Criteria methodology supplements, organizes and puts in order the 
activities and best practices of IT products or systems developers.  Thanks to the CC methodology, 
sensor systems developers, manufacturers and users can provide assurance to their solutions. Besides, 
the methodology allows independent evaluation and worldwide recognized certification.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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